Comments on: Dingell defends his poison pill plan in a confusing, misleading op-ed http://climateprogress.org/2007/08/02/dingell-defends-his-poison-pill-plan-in-a-confusing-misleading-op-ed/ The Latest on Climate Science, Solutions, and Politics Sat, 21 Nov 2009 22:18:44 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.5 hourly 1 By: Delores http://climateprogress.org/2007/08/02/dingell-defends-his-poison-pill-plan-in-a-confusing-misleading-op-ed/#comment-46992 Delores Wed, 06 May 2009 13:58:23 +0000 http://climateprogress.org/2007/08/02/dingell-defends-his-poison-pill-plan-in-a-confusing-misleading-op-ed/#comment-46992 There is obviously a lot to know about this. I think you made some good points in Features also. There is obviously a lot to know about this. I think you made some good points in Features also.

]]> By: Earl Killian http://climateprogress.org/2007/08/02/dingell-defends-his-poison-pill-plan-in-a-confusing-misleading-op-ed/#comment-4882 Earl Killian Thu, 02 Aug 2007 23:34:46 +0000 http://climateprogress.org/2007/08/02/dingell-defends-his-poison-pill-plan-in-a-confusing-misleading-op-ed/#comment-4882 It is also not clear that the regulatory systems need to cost Americans anything, on average. "Cap-and-trade" is a confusing term. There are at least three more precise terms that should obsolete it according to the GRIST article cited below: cap-and-grandfather, cap-and-auction, and cap-and-allocate. If the US implements cap-and-auction, and then returns the auction proceeds to the people (e.g. simply divide the proceeds equally by all residents) then the system is revenue-neutral to the government, and the average payment by individuals is zero. Of course, those who use more than the average have a net outlay, and those who use less have net income. In that way it is direct efficiency incentive. Of course, people would have extra expenses or savings independent of the auction fees, because at first prices would rise beyond the cost of the auction fees (as in any quota system), but efficiency improvements would then offset this. E.g. Californians pay 50% more per kWh than many other states, but they use 44% less kWh, so their bills are about the same (and the planet benefits). http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2007/5/18/142149/148 It is also not clear that the regulatory systems need to cost Americans anything, on average. “Cap-and-trade” is a confusing term. There are at least three more precise terms that should obsolete it according to the GRIST article cited below: cap-and-grandfather, cap-and-auction, and cap-and-allocate. If the US implements cap-and-auction, and then returns the auction proceeds to the people (e.g. simply divide the proceeds equally by all residents) then the system is revenue-neutral to the government, and the average payment by individuals is zero. Of course, those who use more than the average have a net outlay, and those who use less have net income. In that way it is direct efficiency incentive. Of course, people would have extra expenses or savings independent of the auction fees, because at first prices would rise beyond the cost of the auction fees (as in any quota system), but efficiency improvements would then offset this. E.g. Californians pay 50% more per kWh than many other states, but they use 44% less kWh, so their bills are about the same (and the planet benefits).

http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2007/5/18/142149/148

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