Yet you fail to mention that weakness also underlies your strategy: “deploy existing and near-term low-carbon technologies as fast as is humanly possible.”

The conclusions of studies would clearly show that by insistency on emissions reducing technologies (let’s just call them ripoff technologies for the spite of it) any deployment of sufficient scale will involve substantial deployment of technologies that do not represent real emissions reductions. Isn’t it STARK????

At least these so-called ripoffsets put into practical numerical terms the carbon savings that are achieved through certain practices. It’s clear that the claims can be evaluated and false reporting practices can be mitigated. It’s clear to the American taxpayers that spending billions of taxpayer dollars on new unproven technologies at high rates is not going to happen. Furthermore, it is not an easy feat to measure improvements on a global scale of the effect of technologies that are deployed in manageable sized projects.

And the worst thing is, if you add a large number to a small number, the result is larger than the large number. So your solution ends up with more of a problem, not less. On the other hand, the goal of offsets, though it may be more difficult to accomplish, is to make less of a problem. Instead of laughing at google for not being as carbon neutral as they claim, we could instead start to urge companies like google to become carbon negative. Only through negativity can gains be made on a global scale.

Jeffery Ball’s WSJ article highlights an issue that has surrounded carbon offsets for a while now. The article echoes the concerns brought about when the House tried to green itself last winter. Now the term rip-offsets has been coined to describe offsets where the underlying project does not provide additionality.

But in this recent hubbub, let’s not lose sight of the fact that well-designed programs that marry public policy and market forces can be very powerful in solving ecological problems. The shining success is clearly the EPA’s Acid Rain program that has virtually solved the acid rain problem at a fraction of the projected cost and has been the model for Kyoto’s cap and trade design. So rather than dismiss offsets entirely, let’s understand their role in the fight against global warming and improve on today’s market-based approaches.

Transparency, Choice and Value

It’s challenging to birth a voluntary carbon market where there has been, by and large, no regulatory framework. In the absence of federal leadership on Kyoto and due to an evolving variety of certification standards, there have been several models that have evolved to develop a voluntary carbon market in the US, both exchange and broker-based. To mitigate the challenges highlighted in the recent articles and improve the pace of market development, we need new approaches that bring three key elements to the equation – transparency, choice and value.

The problem highlighted in Mr. Ball’s article is a lack of additionality – namely people are getting paid for something they’re already doing, or, as the landfill owner in the article put it: “It seemed a little suspicious that we could get money for doing nothing.”

While additionality is the symptom, the lack of transparency is the root cause. A buyer cannot determine the quality of the credit without understanding the project that generated it and the standards and protocols certifying the offset. If the offset is co-mingled with offsets from a variety of projects, the task gets even harder.

A second challenge is a lack of choice: any given broker or exchange may only have a handful of projects or project types for a buyer to evaluate. With less choice, there will be less market activity.

Finally, the value of the offset tends to be opaque. There really isn’t a published market price for offsets because they have differing value based on the project generating them (type, certification standard, credit risk, delivery risk, etc). The lack of a pricing mechanism where a buyer can be confident that they’re getting a transparent, market price for a specific credit is also a drag on the pace of market development.

Offsets are fulfilling an important role in bringing market approaches to increase the velocity of capital from greenhouse gas mitigator to project operator.

Let’s not let flaws in some of the early business models cause us to abandon our efforts to solve the most challenging environmental problem of our generation. Rather, let’s improve on these early models to create more efficient and effective market mechanisms.

Phil Adams, President

World Energy Solutions, Inc. (www.worldenergy.com)

Joe, what is wrong if the methane capture off-set “mainly just accelerates some inevitable projects a few years”? Those few years matter a lot if we are going to avoid runaway GW. Following your argument, they ought to be phased out. Fine. Of course, methane capture is not likely to be a big player, but if not, coal companies cannot hide behind it.

Regarding the Stanford estimate that “between 1/3 and 2/3 of emission off-sets under CDM do not represent actual emission cuts,” there is a big difference between 1/3 and 2/3. At 1/3, it might be worth keeping the off-sets while working to tighten them. At 2/3, it’s probably hopeless. Without a more precise figure, there is the danger of confirmation bias, focusing on the 1/3 or the 2/3, depending on one’s bias.

I deny “assuming facts that are not in evidence.” By using an “if” statement, I was saying “suppose we assume that….” This is very different from “assuming facts,” which implies believing the facts are, well, “facts.” I’m sorry if you read it differently.

The larger issue is whether off-sets in general should be part of a federal program. You have presented a powerful case that they should not, given the possibility of industry’s using them to avoid real reductions. Is there any objection to a market for individuals to buy off-sets? (Caveat emptor, of course.)

I can think of two methods to sequester carbon dioxide which will cost about $30–40 per tonne of CO2. One of these, mineralization via olivine, offers the propect that the price might be brought down to around $15 per tonne, eventually.